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Abstract 
We investigate the strategic decision behavior of female entrepreneurs in a realistic market 
entry experiment where individuals started with gains or losses experienced prior to the game. 
We compare the entry behavior of female entrepreneurs to the entry behavior of male 
entrepreneurs and to the entry behavior of female and male students. We find that female 
entrepreneurs show entry patterns very similar to that of male entrepreneurs and very different 
from female students: female entrepreneurs on average over enter markets and do not react to 
their opponents’ prior experiences much. The same accounts for male entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, we find that entrepreneurs in general exhibit significantly higher mean entry 
probabilities than students, whereby students mean entry rate is close to the mixed strategy 
equilibrium. 
Keywords:  Female Entrepreneurship, Strategic Decision Behavior, Market Entry, 
Experimental Economics 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wir untersuchen das strategische Entscheidungsverhalten weiblicher Unternehmer in einem 
realistischen Markteintrittsexperiment in dem die Probanden mit vorherigen Gewinn- und 
Verlusterfahrungen in das Spiel gehen. Wir vergleichen das Markteintrittsverhalten weib-
licher Unternehmer mit dem Markteintrittsverhalten von männlichen Unternehmern und dem 
Markteintrittsverhalten von weiblichen und männlichen Studenten. Weibliche Unternehmer 
zeigen Eintrittsmuster, die denen von männlichen Unternehmern sehr ähnlich sind und die 
sehr anders sind als die von weiblichen Studenten: Weibliche Unternehmer treten im 
Durchschnitt übermäßig häufig in Märkte ein und reagieren nicht sehr stark auf die vorherigen 
Erfahrungen ihrer Gegenspieler. Das Gleiche trifft auf männliche Unternehmer zu. Darüber 
hinaus finden wir signifikant höhere durchschnittliche Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten bei 
Unternehmern als bei Studenten, wobei die durchschnittliche Eintrittsrate der Studenten sehr 
nah an der gemischten Gleichgewichtsstrategie liegt.  
Schlüsselwörter: weibliche Unternehmer, Strategisches Entscheidungsverhalten, 
Markteintritt, Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung 
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1. Introduction 
In Western countries males are twice as likely to be involved in early-stage entrepreneurial 
activities and established business ownership than females (Bosma et al., 2009; Allen et al., 
2007; Blanchflower, 2004; Minniti and Arenius, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2001). Moreover, in 
most countries women’s share in total entrepreneurial activity still lags behind the share of 
women in the labor force (Verheul et al., 2005; OECD, 2002). Thus, for entrepreneurship 
researchers, consultants, and policy makers the important questions arise how to encourage 
more women to found a business, and how to help female entrepreneurs to survive in the 
market. This in turn, on the one hand, requires understanding the reasons why females found 
and run fewer businesses than men and on the other hand a more general understanding of 
who the female entrepreneur is. Our paper deals with the second issue and it concentrates on a 
crucial aspect of entrepreneurial behavior, i.e. strategic decision making.  
The strategic decision behavior, i.e. the decision behavior in situations in which individuals 
have to interact and coordinate with others – like competitors or customers – who typically 
have other interests than we do, is a central aspect of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial 
activities, such as market entry decisions, product pricing, R&D investment decisions, or 
decisions for technological standards, are strongly determined by strategic decision making 
patterns. In various experimental studies women are found to behave differently than men in 
such strategic environments (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998, 1996; Bolton and Katok, 1995; 
Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993; Sell and Wilson, 1991). Still, whether there are significant 
differences between men and women depends on the context and on the risks involved in the 
experimental task (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). In the current paper we want to state the 
question how female entrepreneurs behave in strategic environments. Do female entre-
preneurs differ in their strategic decision behavior from their male counterparts or not? And, 
are female entrepreneurs somehow special or different than other women with respect to their 
strategic decision behavior? 
The approach typically pursued in the literature on female entrepreneurship is to compare 
female and male entrepreneurs and to compare both with non-entrepreneur males and females. 
Several studies based on GEM data, e.g., report on pronounced differences between male and 
female respondents within the entire sample of respondents with respect to their confidence of 
having the skills to found a new business or regarding their fear of failure. In the subgroup of 
entrepreneurs, however, only differences in fear of failure remain between males and females 
(e.g., Koellinger et al., 2009). Hence, although one might expect male and female entre-
preneurs to be similar in general, the question of differences between male and female 
entrepreneurs has to be analyzed and answered separately for different dimensions. Therefore, 
the current study investigates differences and similarities between the strategic behavior of 
female and male entrepreneurs in situations in which they have to coordinate with 
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competitors. It then compares this behavior with the behavior of male and female students 
employing the methodology of experimental economics.  
We use the framework of the simultaneous market entry game, a strategic game that received 
considerable attention in experimental economics research and is well suited for studying 
decision making in an entrepreneurial context (Selten and Gueth, 1982; Rapoport, 1995; 
Rapoport et al., 1998; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Elston et al., 2005). In the market entry 
game, players have to simultaneously decide on entering or not entering a new market. 
Payoffs depend on the total number of market entrants since the market has only a limited 
capacity. If the total number of entrants exceeds this given capacity all players who enter the 
market will suffer a loss. The problem is that players have to decide without being able to 
observe, communicate, or credibly collude with their potential competitors who also consider 
entering this market. Since there are multiple possibilities to reach an equilibrium point where 
no one has an incentive to deviate from his or her chosen decision, it is unclear which players 
are going to enter and which players are going to stay out of the market. In game-theoretic 
terminology, players face a coordination problem concerning their entry decision.  
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) used this experimental paradigm to understand excess entry 
based on overconfidence and derived implications for a better understanding of entre-
preneurship. However, they used student participants instead of real entrepreneur participants. 
Furthermore, the fact that most studies on market entry behavior focus on relatively abstract 
entry situations where all players are symmetric and start without any prior experiences or 
‘history’ has to be called into question. In such abstract situations coordination and the 
anticipation of other individuals’ behavior remains difficult. Moreover, in the real world 
entrepreneurs are rarely in a neutral situation but regularly have encountered gains or losses, 
before, which might influence their behavior. The impact of prior gains and losses on 
subsequent risk taking has been analyzed previously and is consistent with prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)1. In the past, there have 
already been approaches to shape more vivid market entry games, i.e. by incorporating losses 
for those players who do not enter (Rapoport et al., 1998). We extend the approach of 
Rapoport et al. (1998) and bring in a more realistic flavor by experimentally implementing 
asymmetry through pre-game gain and loss experiences that are commonly known to all 
players. We expect such information on ‘history’ to evoke thoughts about the opponents’ 
potential entry decisions. 
We conduct two incentive compatible experiments based on the one-shot simultaneous market 
entry game: one with 108 (54 female and 54 male) entrepreneurs and one with 78 (33 female 
and 45 male) students. The entrepreneurs play the game online, via the internet. The students 
play the same game in an experimental laboratory. Both groups are compensated for their 
participation based on their performance in the experimental task. Students face real monetary 
consequences. Entrepreneurs play for amounts of salmon caviar. We analyze mean entry rates 
                                                          
1  A more detailed analysis follows in the discussion section. 
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and individual entry probabilities with respect to a player’s own and his opponents’ gain and 
loss experience.  
We find that entrepreneurs exhibit a significantly higher mean market entry probability than 
students and have on average a tendency to over enter the market compared to the mixed 
strategy equilibrium. The students instead show a mean entry rate that is close to the mixed 
strategy equilibrium of 50%. This result is in line with the numerous papers arguing that there 
might be a general tendency of entrepreneurs to over enter markets (e.g., Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Being a men or a women had no absolute effect 
on mean entry probabilities or mean expected payoffs. Still, subjects’ reactions to opponents’ 
situations strongly depend on whether they are male or female. Furthermore and most 
importantly, we find that the behavior of male and female entrepreneurs is very similar on the 
one hand and that behavioral differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are 
larger with females than with males. No matter whether these results are due to female 
entrepreneurs self-selecting into entrepreneurship, learning to adapt to the specific conditions 
of being an entrepreneur, or due to only the “fittest” surviving, they support the hypothesis 
that women differ more from their peers in order to be an entrepreneur than men do.  
2. Literature 
Three streams of literature are of special interest to our study: 1) the experimental literature on 
gender differences, 2) the literature on gender differences related to female entrepreneurship, 
and 3) the literature on female entrepreneurship itself. 
2.1 Experimental literature on gender differences 
The question whether men and women differ in their interaction behavior and in their decision 
making generated an ongoing debate in the social and behavioral sciences but also in 
experimental economics. First experimental tests for differences in behavior of men and 
women involving monetary incentives go back to Rapoport and Chammah (1965). They 
started with what later became a long series of studies on gender differences within the 
experimental paradigm of the prisoner’s dilemma. These studies showed mixed evidence: 
some found men less selfish, others found women less selfish, and still others found no 
difference (see Eckel and Grossman, 1998 for a brief review). More recently, experimenters 
have turned to ultimatum and dictatorship experiments as well as public goods games. For an 
excellent overview see the meta-study of Eckel and Grossman (2008), who find no significant 
evidence of systematic differences in the play of men and women in settings where 
respondents are exposed to risk; but in settings where risk is absent women are less 
individually-oriented and more socially-oriented than those of men.  
Another stream of experiments on gender differences in strategic settings deals with the 
behavior, performance and propensity to participate in tournaments. Gneezy, Niederle and 
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Rustichini (2003) run controlled experiments to test whether men and women differ in their 
ability or propensity to perform in competitive environments. In their study men’s 
performance was significantly increased by tournament incentives relative to the benchmark 
performance whereas women’s performance was not increased. This gender gap in 
performance was larger in mixed gender tournaments than in single-sex tournaments. When 
participants were paid according to piece rates no gender gap was found. Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their 
selection into a competitive environment. They find a gender gap in tournament entry that is 
not explained by performance. Factors such as risk and feedback aversion play a negligible 
role. Instead they show that the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more 
overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition. “The 
result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it.” 
Given these results on strategic behavior of men and women, behavioral tendencies appear to 
be hard to generalize and studies on male and female behavior in the market entry game are 
lacking in the literature. A directional hypothesis on gender differences is hence impossible.  
2.2 Literature on gender differences related to entrepreneurship 
Within the extended literature on gender differences, some aspects are especially related to 
entrepreneurial aptitude and skill sets: For instance, women tend to have less self-confidence 
and also expect to receive poorer results than men (Deaux, 1984; Deaux and Farris, 1977). 
Consequently, women are found to have a lower tendency to be overconfident than men2 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Beyer, 1990; 
Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Deaux and Farris, 1977). In early studies, women often consider 
their abilities inferior to those of males even though they are not (Carr et al., 1985; Lenney, 
1977; Crandall, 1969). Women also exhibit a stronger tendency than men to see the cause of 
success in external factors and not in their own personal power (Erkut, 1983; Levine et al., 
1982; Berg et al., 1981). Furthermore, women are repeatedly found to be less risk-seeking 
than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Johnson and Powell, 1994; 
Sexton and Bowman-Upton, 1990; Levin et al., 1988; Hudgens and Fatkin, 1985). However, 
Byrnes et al. (1999) show in a meta analysis of 150 risk experiments that while women in 
some situations are significantly more risk averse, many studies find no gender differences. 
Summarizing these results, the overall picture shows that women in general score lower in 
characteristics that are important determinants for entrepreneurial activity.  
                                                          
2  However, differences in overconfidence and gender differences in overconfidence are task dependent. 
Studies show that overconfidence is sensitive to the difficulty of the task (Moore and Small 2004). Gender 
differences in overconfidence have primarily been found in “masculine tasks” (Lundeberg, Fox, and 
Puncochar 1994).  
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2.3 Literature on female entrepreneurship 
Within the field of entrepreneurship research itself, the topic of female entrepreneurship has 
attracted growing interest and research effort since Simon Parker stated that “despite its 
intrinsic interest and importance, the subject of female entrepreneurship has arguably not 
commanded the degree of research effort that it deserves.” (Parker, 2004, p. 129).  Since 
2004, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor publishes annual special topic reports on Women 
and Entrepreneurship. Still, given the huge differences in male and female self-employment 
rates referred to above, the literature on this gender gap is sparse.  
The existing studies report that women are less likely to start a business than men (Minniti et 
al., 2005; Blanchflower, 2004), that women’s level of optimism and self-confidence with 
respect to starting a business is lower than that of men and that the fear of failure is more 
pronounced with women than with men (Allen et al., 2007; Koellinger et al., 2009).  
Relative to women who do not indicate an entrepreneurial activity female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more confident in their own skills, more likely to know other entrepreneurs, and more 
alert to the existence of unexploited opportunities than other women. Furthermore, in all these 
aspects they do not differ much from male entrepreneurs (Allen et al., 2008). Only the 
difference in fear of failure observed between men and women in the general population 
remains between male and female entrepreneurs (Koellinger et al., 2009).  
Hence, while men in general score higher in most characteristics related to entrepreneurial 
aptitude and skill set, like e.g. internal locus of control and self-confidence, than women, male 
and female entrepreneurs do not differ much in these characteristics. This is plausible since 
male and female entrepreneurs have to survive in the same, competitive environment. Thus, 
one should expect male and female entrepreneurs to be more similar to each other than men 
and women in general no matter whether these similarities are due to female entrepreneurs 
self-selecting into entrepreneurship, learning to adapt to this specific environment, or to 
market selection (‘survival of the fittest’). Since the average man exhibits a higher level of 
characteristics that are found among entrepreneurs, like internal locus of control or optimism 
and self-confidence with respect to starting a business, than women this also means that the 
gap between women and female entrepreneurs is larger than the gap between men and male 
entrepreneurs.  
Assuming that these general patterns hold for strategic behavior, we are able to formulate the 
following core hypothesis we are going to test in our experimental study: 
H: With respect to their strategic behavior female entrepreneurs are more different from female 
non-entrepreneurs than male entrepreneurs from male non-entrepreneurs. 
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3. Experimental Design 
In order to analyze the market entry behavior of female entrepreneurs and compare it with the 
entry behavior male entrepreneurs on the one hand and with that of female students on the 
other hand, we conduct two incentive compatible simultaneous market entry experiments: one 
with 108 (54 female and 54 male) entrepreneurs and one with 78 (33 female and 45 male) 
students. Prior to the game, all participants receive a participation fee and are then randomly 
selected to experience either a gain or a loss of one experimental unit before the experiment 
begins. Since incentivizing entrepreneurs is a critical issue, we customize incentives for 
entrepreneurs and students accordingly: appropriate incentives for entrepreneurs include 
either high monetary stakes or other rewards that also have a symbolic value. This reflects 
that playing for such a reward is easier to identify with than playing for small amounts of 
money (Schade, 2005; Schade and Burmeister-Lamp, 2009). Thus, while students receive 6€ 
for one experimental unit, the entrepreneurs receive a glass of caviar for one experimental 
unit. The participation fee was 14€ for the students and two glasses of caviar for the 
entrepreneurs. In order to ensure that equal shares of participants of each gender are put into a 
loss condition and into a gain condition a computerized random device is used in both 
experiments. Hence, all participants start the game with a “history” of either a loss or a gain 
experience. This gain or loss experience is common knowledge to all players; in each round 
participants are informed about the types (gain or loss experience) of their two opponents.  
Participants then start with the experiment and play the following simultaneous market entry 
game in groups of three (N=3) players with two randomly selected, anonymous opponents. 
Players do not receive any information about the sex of their opponents. In the market entry 
game players have to simultaneously decide on entering or not entering a certain market. This 
market has only a limited capacity c. If the total number of players entering the market 
exceeds this capacity, all entrants will suffer a loss.  
The payoff function for our study is given by:  




1sifN(s)]2[r
0sif0
(s)u
i
i
i
 
where ui(s) is player i’s payoff given the vector of individual decisions s (0 = stay out; 1 = 
enter) with i=1,2,3 and N(s) is the total number of players who enter the market. The market 
capacity in our case is 2. The constant r reflects one experimental unit and remains fixed 
throughout the game. All parameters are common knowledge.  
Players should prefer to enter the market as long as there is nobody else in the market. They 
should be indifferent between entering and staying out of the market if there is one other 
player who enters since their payoff would be zero in both cases. And, as soon as there are 
two other players who enter the market they should prefer to stay out of the market in order 
not to suffer losses. But as described above, the problem is that players have to decide 
simultaneously without observing and without being able to communicate or credibly collude 
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with their potential competitors who also consider entering this market. The only information 
they might use to coordinate their entry decisions is their own and their opponents’ prior gain 
or loss situation. Still, the question is who is going to enter the market and who is going to 
stay out. With other words, players face a coordination problem concerning their entry 
decisions.  
There are six [(3! / 2! [3-2]!) + 3] pure strategy Nash-Equilibria for this game, namely all 
situations in which the number of entrants equals the market capacity of two plus all 
situations in which there is only one entrant and the others stay out of the market since they 
are indifferent between entering and not entering the market; both options lead to a zero 
profit. The mixed strategy equilibrium is given by all players entering with a probability of ½ 
(Rapoport et al., 1998).  
Individuals play 8 rounds (108 entrepreneurs * 8 rounds = 864 entrepreneurs observations;  
78 students * 8 rounds = 624 student observations). In order to avoid learning effects, no 
feedback about the outcome of previous rounds is provided throughout the experiment. Each 
participant is confronted with all possible combinations of player types, e.g., with two 
opponents who won an experimental unit prior to the game, with two opponents who lost an 
experimental unit prior to the game and with one opponent who lost and one opponent who 
won an experimental unit prior to the game.  
As a consequence of the existence of mixed strategy equilibria players are enabled to 
explicitly state mix strategies (Camerer, 2003, Chapter 7). Specifically, they have to 
determine the proportions of E-balls (market entry) and NE-balls (no market entry) in a 100-
ball urn. A computerized random device picks one of the strategies, the probabilities for this 
random draw being directly derived from the proportions of E-balls and NE-balls in the urn. 
At the end of the experiment, for each participant one round is randomly selected as the basis 
for his or her final payoff. After they made the market entry decisions participants are asked 
for their risk premium3 and basic statistical data like age and sex. After they answered these 
questions the students receive information about their results and are paid accordingly. The 
entrepreneurs in the online study play the game individually at a self-chosen time, which is 
much more convenient for the them and therewith provides better circumstances for a 
concentrated participation in the experiment. Once all participants finished the experiment, 
they are randomly matched to groups of three (for each round) and receive their results via 
email. Results and payments for them are finalized within one week. In the appendix you find 
the full instructions the students receive. The entrepreneurs receive almost identical 
instructions, that are only slightly adjusted to the needs of an online experiment. Note, the 
results of the neutral treatment in the student experiment are not reported in this study since 
the entrepreneurs did not receive this treatment. 
                                                          
3  Risk propensity proves to be practically irrelevant for most situations. Therefore, it is not dealt with in this 
paper. Results are available from the first author upon request.  
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4. Findings 
4.1 Basic sample information4 
The study is conducted with 54 (50%) female and 54 (50%) male entrepreneurs and 33 
(42.3%) female and 45 (57.7%) male students. The entrepreneurs in our sample are aged 26 to 
68 years with an average age of 45 years. 56.5% of them founded their business themselves. 
The students in our experiment are aged 19 to 34 with an average age of 24 years. 65% of the 
students studied business or economics, 3% studied mathematics, 0.9% studied computer 
sciences, and the remaining 31.7% of the students major in other fields. Male and female 
students show a very similar distribution concerning the subjects studied.  
4.2 Testing the core hypothesis  
Figure 1 shows mean entry probabilities of male and female entrepreneurs as well as male and 
female students. As expected, the graph indicates an interaction effect: female entrepreneurs 
have the highest entry probabilities, but they only slightly and non-significantly differ from 
the entry probabilities of male entrepreneurs. Female students, however, have the lowest entry 
probabilities, and male students’ entry probabilities are located between those of female 
students and male entrepreneurs. We tested these results in a univariate ANOVA and 
calculated the parameter estimate for the interaction effect (see Table 1(a)-(d) in the 
appendix). The difference between entrepreneurs and students (main effect) is statistically 
significant on a p < .001 level (two-sided). Entrepreneurs’ mean entry rate is higher than the 
mean entry rate of students. The difference between male and female respondents (main 
effect) is non-significant. Most importantly, and supporting our core hypothesis, the 
interaction parameter has the predicted sign, i.e., being a female and being a student at the 
same time has a negative effect on entry probability. In a one-sided test, this parameter 
reaches statistical significance on a p < .05 level. Hence, the behavioral difference between 
female entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is larger than the behavioral difference between 
male entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
                                                          
4  More details are available from the first author upon request. 
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Figure 1:  Mean entry probability of males vs. females 
 
Source: own figure  
 
4.3 Additional results: The effect of gain and loss experiences 
In order to also bring in the effects of own and opponents’ starting position (pre-game gain or 
loss experience) on the mean entry probability of the respondents we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA (see Table 2(a)-(b) in the appendix). As repeated measures in the linear 
model we designed a variable “factor” accounting for opponents’ starting positions (pre-game 
gain or loss experience). The dependent variable ‘mean entry probability’ is measured three 
times on each individual. The levels in the variable factor are given by (1) mean entry 
probability in games against two players with gain experiences, (2) mean entry probability in 
games against one player with gain experience and one player with loss experience, and (3) 
mean entry probability in games against two players with loss experiences. Please, recall that 
the participants stated probabilities (explicit mixes instead of yes/no decisions on entry). Since 
the sphericity assumption is violated, we report on the results of a Greenhouse-Geisser test.  
As a result of this analysis we find significant within-subjects effects (interaction effects of 
variables factor*gender, factor*own prior experience, factor*gender*group) and between-
subjects effects (variables own prior experience, group).  
Opponents’ prior experiences (variable factor with levels: gain/gain, gain/loss, loss/loss) do 
not have a significant main effect on mean entry probabilities of the participants (see table 
2(a) in the appendix). Hence, there is no general reaction pattern to opponents’ prior 
experiences. The interaction effect of opponents’ prior experiences and gender (variable 
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factor*gender) is highly significant, F(1.47, 261.362) = 11.42;   p < .001 (see table 2(a) in the 
appendix). It indicates that individual reactions to opponents’ prior experiences strongly 
depend on the gender of the respondent. Note, that gender was not significant when we only 
looked at mean entry rates with respect to gender and group (see table 1(c) in the appendix). 
Furthermore, the interaction effect between opponents’ prior experience and gender is 
moderated by group (variable factor *gender* group), F(1.47, 261.362) = 2.774, p < .1 (see 
table 2(a) in the appendix). 
Own prior experience had a highly significant main effect on mean entry probabilities,  
F(1, 178) = 16.361, p < .001 (see table 2(b) in the appendix), and a marginally significant 
interaction effect with opponents prior experience, F(1.47, 261.362) = 3.343, p < .1 (see table 
2(a) in the appendix). Group has again a highly significant main effect, F(1, 178) = 15.834,  
p < .001 (see table 2(b) in the appendix). 
The mean entry patterns that can be observed when accounting for a player’s own and his/her 
opponents’ starting positions (pre-game gain or loss experience) are depicted in figures 2(a)-(d): 
male and female students exhibit opposed entry patterns. For instance, male students enter 
very frequently when they play against two opponents who have experienced a gain; they 
enter less frequently when they play against one winner and one loser, and they enter rather 
infrequently when they play against two losers. On the contrary, female students enter very 
frequently when they play against two losers, they enter less when they play against one 
winner and one looser; and they enter very infrequently when they play against two winners. 
As expected, this huge gender difference observed with students disappears with male and 
female entrepreneurs: both have a tendency to over enter the market compared to the mixed 
strategy equilibrium and they do not much react to their opponents prior experiences (see also 
table 3 in the appendix).  
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Figure 2 (a)-(d): Patterns of mean entry probabilities 
 
   
(a) mean entry probability of male entrepreneurs  (b) mean entry probability of male students 
 
 
   
(c) mean entry probability of female entrepreneurs  (d) mean entry probability of female students 
 
 
Source:  own figures 
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4.4 Summary 
Analyzing mean entry probabilities of male and female entrepreneurs as well as male and 
female students we find an interaction effect between group and gender. The mean entry 
behavior of female entrepreneurs differs more from that of other women than the mean entry 
behavior of male entrepreneurs differs from that of other men. Hence, our core hypothesis is 
supported by the data: the behavioral gap between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is 
bigger with women than with men. This applies for the general mean entry as well as for the 
entry patterns taking into account own and opponents’ prior experiences. We also find that 
entrepreneurs enter significantly more often than students, and have on average a tendency to 
over enter the market compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium. This result is in line with 
the numerous papers indicating that there might be a general tendency of entrepreneurs to 
over enter markets (e.g., Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). The 
students show a mean entry rate that is close to the mixed strategy equilibrium of 50%. Being 
a men or a women had no absolute effect on mean entry probabilities or mean expected 
payoffs. Still, subjects’ reactions to opponents’ situation strongly depend on whether they are 
male or female. Own prior experiences significantly influenced entry behavior of both 
students and entrepreneurs in our sample: having experienced a loss prior to the game, 
entrepreneurs and students enter more frequently than having experienced a gain.  
5. Discussion and implications 
In this study, female entrepreneurs’ market entry behavior is shown to be similar to that of 
male entrepreneurs on the one hand and very different from that of female students on the 
other hand. Behavioral differences between male and female entrepreneurs are found to be 
very small. The differences between entrepreneurs and students are larger with females than 
with males. Thereby our core hypothesis is supported.  
No matter whether these results are due to female entrepreneurs self-selecting into entre-
preneurship, learning to adapt to the specific conditions of being an entrepreneur, or due to 
only the “fittest” surviving, they support the hypothesis that woman differ more from their 
peers in order to be an entrepreneur than men do. This finding is especially interesting as the 
comparison group consisted mainly of female business, economics, and mathematics students 
– a group of women who self-selected into a competitive environment. Our findings on mean 
entry rates of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are finally in line with the numerous 
papers indicating that there might be a general tendency of entrepreneurs to over enter markets.  
Despite the clarity of all these findings, it is impossible to come up with clear-cut 
recommendations without further research. Before such recommendations can be made, more 
light has to be shed on the reasons for the only small differences between male and female 
strategic behavior. If the similarity of male and female entrepreneurs were an effect of self-
selection, and if the observed behavioral differences between entrepreneurs and non-entre-
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preneurs were leading to successful entrepreneurship, one should be careful in encouraging 
entrepreneurship of individuals that just do not ‘fit’ into the general behavioral pattern that 
would be required from entrepreneurs. Encouraging female entrepreneurship would then 
require identifying more women with this specific set of behavioral characteristics. However, 
the observed over entry of male and female entrepreneurs that we were able to replicate in our 
controlled setting has been interpreted as something potentially negative previously (e.g., 
Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Koellinger et al., 2007). Therefore, it is not completely clear what 
kind of male and female entrepreneurs to look for. Given that most entrepreneurs in our study 
have survived in their markets for years, however, their behavioral patterns might be 
interpreted as something that may at least not severely hinder them from being successful.  
A ‘learning’ interpretation would lead to very different implications: assuming that a 
heterogeneous group of more or less skilled entrepreneurs, no matter whether they are male or 
female, would enter the market and their behavior would then be shaped by requirements and 
experiences leading to very similar behavioral patterns of males and females, a ‘tonnage 
approach’ to entrepreneurship (produce many entrepreneurs, no matter what) would be 
appropriate in a sense that individuals just have to be encouraged to become entrepreneurs. 
Since females are underrepresented, relatively more effort would have to be put into 
stimulating females to become entrepreneurs. No matter how differently males and females 
start to begin with, each individual would learn his or her lesson or would be selected out.  
An approach that would shed light on the appropriateness of different means to foster 
(female) entrepreneurship whilst keeping the rigor of the general methodological approach 
applied in this study, would be experiments on male and female respondents’ strategic 
behavior in repeated strategic play with feedback on success and payoffs provided on a round-
by-round basis. In such repeated play, learning can be studied without losing experimental 
control. Such multiple-rounds experiments have been successfully applied in other fields of 
experimental economics (see, for an overview, Camerer, 2003, Chapters 6 and 7; Kagel and 
Roth, 1995, Chapters 2 and 4).  
There is ample experimental and field evidence for the large effects of prior gains and losses 
on subsequent choices in non-strategic decisions (Bowman, 1980, 1982; Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1988; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Weber and Camerer, 1998; 
Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Weber and Zuchel, 2005). These 
behaviors are often argued to be consistent with the convex-concave property of prospect 
theory’s value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
context dependent preferences (Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), 
and aggregation of prior experiences with future (potential) outcomes (Thaler, 1985; Thaler 
and Johnson, 1990). Extensive research concerning this phenomenon is found in the literature 
on decision making. Interestingly, however, a systematic analysis of such effects is still 
missing for strategic games. We have evidence for such behavior also in a strategic set-up: 
Own prior experiences significantly influenced entry behavior of both entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs in our study. Having experienced a loss prior to the game, participants entered 
more frequently than having experienced a gain 
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6. Conclusions 
We confirm in a controlled experimental setting the finding from the empirical entrepreneur-
ship literature that male and female entrepreneurs are much more similar with respect to 
characteristics relevant to entrepreneurial activity that men and women in general. We are 
also able to expand this notion to a realistic strategic decision situation that has previously not 
been analyzed with respect to behavioral differences between men and women. Further 
experimental research should shed light on the ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’ dimension of the 
problem.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1(a)-(d): Mean entry probability by group and gender  
 
 
Table 1(a): Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value label N 
 Group 1  Students 78 
2  Entrepreneurs 108 
 Gender 1  Female 87 
2  Male 99 
 
 
Table 1(b): Descritive Statistics 
Dependent variable: mean entry probabilty 
 Group Gender Mean Std. deviation N 
 Students Female 45,5375 18,19200 33 
Male 55,8115 27,12731 45 
Total 51,4648 24,16909 78 
 Entrepreneurs Female 66,5463 24,29583 54 
Male 63,0880 22,42572 54 
Total 64,8171 23,33473 108 
 Total Female 58,5774 24,33202 87 
Male 59,7805 24,81219 99 
Total 59,2178 24,52977 186 
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Table 1(c): Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent variable: mean entry probabilty 
Source Typ III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 10407.109a 3 3469.036 6.257 .000 
Intercept 595711.111 1 595711.111 1074.426 .000 
Group 8932.975 1 8932.975 16.112 .000 
Gender 518.670 1 518.670 .935 .335 
Group * Gender 2105.539 1 2105.539 3.798 .053 
Error 100909.169 182 554.446   
Total 763570.535 186    
Corrected Total 111316.278 185    
a. R Squared = .093 (Adjusted R Squared = .079) 
 
 
Table 1(d): Parameter Estimates 
Dependent variable: mean entry probabilty 
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
90% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept 63,088 3,204 19,689 ,000 57,790 68,386 
[Group=1] -7,276 4,753 -1,531 ,128 -15,134 ,581 
[Group=2] 0a . . . . . 
[Gender=1] 3,458 4,532 ,763 ,446 -4,034 10,950 
[Gender=2] 0a . . . . . 
[Group=1] * [Gender=1] -13,732 7,047 -1,949 ,053 -25,383 -2,082 
[Group=1] * [Gender=2] 0a . . . . . 
[Group=2] * [Gender=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Group=2] * [Gender=2] 0a . . . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 2 (a)-(b): Testing the effect of gain and loss experiences  
 
 
Table 2(a): Greenhouse-Geisser Test for Within-Subjects Effects 
 Source 
Typ III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Factor 641.563 1.468 436.934 .403 .605 
 Factor * Gender 18180.770 1.468 12381.958 11.421 .000 
 Factor * Prior experience 5321.885 1.468 3624.454 3.343 .051 
 Factor * Group 2343.825 1.468 1596.255 1.472 .232 
 Factor * Gender * Prior experience 2070.980 1.468 1410.435 1.301 .268 
 Factor * Gender * Group 4415.496 1.468 3007.160 2.774 .081 
 Factor * Prior experience * Group 1167.393 1.468 795.050 .733 .442 
 Factor * Gender * Prior experience * Group 8.347 1.468 5.685 .005 .982 
 Error(Factor) 283365.362 261.362 1084.186   
 
 
 
 
Table 2(b): Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 Source 
Typ III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Constant 1767906.917 1 1767906.917 1171.054 .000 
 Gender 479.347 1 479.347 .318 .574 
 Prior experience 24699.657 1 24699.657 16.361 .000 
 Group 23903.454 1 23903.454 15.834 .000 
 Gender * Prior experience 2442.345 1 2442.345 1.618 .205 
 Gender * Group 3780.999 1 3780.999 2.505 .115 
 Prior experience * Group 493.926 1 493.926 .327 .568 
 Gender * Prior experience * Group 2182.455 1 2182.55 1.446 .231 
 Error 268721.490 178 1509.671   
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Table 3:  Mean entry rates with respect to own and opponents’ prior experience 
 
 
Table 3: Mean entry probability with respect to own and opponents’ prior experience 
 Group                Gender Prior experience 
Games against  
gain/ gain 
Games against 
gain/ loss 
Games against  
loss/loss 
 Entrepreneurs Male Loss 77.91 70.35 59.04 
Gain 58.11 56.45 56.57 
Female Loss 68.85 73.20 74.91 
Gain 59.33 59.31 63.67 
 Students Male Loss 79.25 69.08 52.63 
Gain 46.05 36.03 46.68 
Female Loss 35.22 58.51 60.19 
Gain 28.25 43.18 60.68 
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Instructions for the Market Entry Game: 
 
Where necessary, explanations of experimental procedures are added in bold italics for better understandability. 
The actual instructions and information received by the participants is shown in boxes. 
 
 
After being seated at their places, and before beginning with the computer-based part of the experiment, the 
participants were paid a participation fee of € 14.00 and told to pocket it. 
 
They were then informed of the following: 
 
 
We will now conduct a lottery with the following features: 
 
There are 12 balls with numbers from 1 to 12 in a bingo cage. They will be drawn without replacement, i.e. once 
drawn, a ball will not be placed back into the cage. 
A draw of a ball with the numbers 1-4 will result in a gain of € 6.00 for you. 
A draw of a ball with the numbers 5-8 results in no payment (€ 0.00). 
A draw of a ball with the numbers 9-12 will result in a loss of € 6.00. 
 
The draws will take place in private at each participant’s seat and will only be seen by that participant. 
 
 
The individual bingo ball lotteries were then conducted and the respondents informed about their (gain, loss, 
or neutral) outcome. 
 
The following information was then provided: 
 
 
In the experiment you will play games with changing counterparts. In addition to the rules of the game, the only 
information all of you will have is the outcome of the lottery we just conducted. In other words, you will always 
be informed about the outcome of your respective counterpart, as he or she will be about your outcome. 
 
 
The participants began playing the computer-based game. All of them were presented with the following 
screens in the order given here (Screen type A through G).  
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Screen type A:  
 
Welcome to our experiment on decision-making! 
 
Please pay attention to the following: 
 
 Your decisions in this experiment will depend on your skill and luck, and will result in real 
payments of different amounts. 
 This experiment will take place over several rounds. 
 While the results of each round will not be displayed, a summary of the whole experiment’s results 
will be provided at the end of the experiment. 
 Out of all rounds, one will randomly be selected by the computer. Your game result in this 
randomly chosen round will then be added to your result of the lottery conducted at the beginning 
of the experiment. 
 At the end of the experiment, the experiment’s supervisor will settle your account by paying out or 
collecting the payments from you. 
 You will find a red button at the bottom of each screen. When you understood and completed all 
tasks on that screen, press it to continue. 
 All information is anonymous and will be kept confidential. 
 
Have fun participating in the game!! 
 
 
 
Screen type B: 
 
You will now play a three person game over several rounds. 
 
Your opponent will change from round to round as previously and randomly determined by the 
computer. 
 
 
The values in parantheses varied depending on the participant’s own result and the result of their opponents 
in the bingo cage lottery. 
 
Screen type C: 
 
Reminder 
 
In the lottery conducted at the beginning of the experiment you {suffered a loss of € 6.00 / achieved a 
neutral result of € 0.00 / gained a profit of € 6.00}, which (in addition to any potential gains or losses made 
during the experiment) will be settled at the end of the experiment.  
 
Thus your current account balance is {€ -6.00/€ 0.00/€ 6.00}. 
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Screen type D:  
 
Your Game Situation: 
 
You and your two opponents have the choice of entering a market with limited demand. 
 
If all three of you decide to enter the market, everyone will suffer a loss of € 6.00. 
 
If two of you decide to enter the market, the two entering players as well as the not entering player 
will receive € 0.00. 
 
If only one of you decides to enter the market, he receives € 6.00 and the other two players who did 
not enter receive € 0.00.  
 
If none of you decide to enter the market, all three players receive € 0.00.  
 
 
In the lottery at the beginning of the experiment, your two opponents in this round  
had the following results: 
 
One opponent {suffered a loss of € 6.00 / achieved a neutral result of € 0.00 /  
gained a profit of € 6.00 }. 
 
Your other opponent { suffered a loss of € 6.00 / achieved a neutral result of € 0.00 /  
gained a profit of € 6.00}. 
 
 
Your decision: 
 
Your decision will be made with the help of a virtual raffle drum whose contents will be determined by you. You 
can fill it with a total of 100 tickets (Entry and NoEntry tickets). If an Entry ticket is drawn, you will enter the 
market. If a NoEntry tickets is drawn, you will not enter the market. Please now specify the contents of the drum 
by stating the number of Entry and NoEntry tickets to be included: 
 
 
Please indicate the number of Entry tickets to be placed in the drum: _______ 
 
 
Please indicate the number of NoEntry tickets to be placed in the drum: _______ 
 
 
Subsequently, multiple rounds with changing opponents were played according to screen type D. To ensure 
that the participants noticed that conditions changed from round to round, screen type E was presented prior 
to type D before to each round (except the first). 
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Screen type E:  
 
Information 
 
 
Attention: In this round, the conditions of the game have changed. Please pay close attention to the 
information concerning the outcomes. 
 
 
Several psychometric scales and questions followed the actual experiment and preceded the payout rounds; 
results are not reported in this paper.  
 
Based on the results from the round randomly chosen by the computer and the bingo cage lottery conducted 
at the very beginning of the experimental sessions, screen type F was used to calculate final payments.  
 
Screen type F:  
 
Game Summary 
 
The following table provides a summary of all played round with your chosen number of Entry and 
NoEntry tickets, the resulting strategies (Entry and NoEntry tickets), and your results of each round. 
Moreover, you can identify your opponents’ strategies for every round. 
 
Round Number of E 
Tickets 
Number of NE 
Tickets 
Drawn Ticket Choice of 1st 
Opponent 
Choice of 2nd 
Opponent 
Your Result 
{1…29} {0…100} {0…100} {NE/E} {NE/E} {NE/E} {-6.00/0.00/6.00} 
  
 
 
 
Screen type G: 
 
Final Result 
 
To calculate your payout, round {1…29} was randomly selected of all rounds by the computer. 
 
Source Amount [€] 
Lottery at the beginning of the experiment {-6.00/0.00/6.00} 
Result of randomly chosen round {1…30} {-6.00/0.00/6.00 
Total: {-12.00/-6.00/0.00/6.00/12.00} 
  
 
An amount of € {-12.00/-6.00/0.00/6.00/12.00} will be settled with you. 
 
This is the end of the experiment. Thank you very much for participation. Please quietly stay seated 
and wait until the supervisor has balanced accounts with you. 
 
 
26 Christian Schade, Sabrina Boewe, and Kai Krause 
SiAg-Working Paper 4 (2009); HU Berlin 
About the authors  
Prof. Dr. Christian Schade is director of the Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and 
Innovation Management at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He is head of the project 
“Experiments on entrepreneurial decision making” that is part of the research group 
“Structural change in agriculture”, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). 
Furthermore, he is head of the research project „Innovation and coordination“ funded by the 
Volkswagen Foundation which is a collaborative effort with Columbia University and the 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). Since 2002, he is a research professor 
at the DIW Berlin and since 2006 associate editor of the Journal of Business Venturing 
(Elsevier). His research is based on economic psychology. Preferred fields of application are 
entrepreneurship and innovation research. Methodologically Christian Schade concentrates on 
laboratory experiments, descriptive decision theory, and game theory. 
Address: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
School of Business and Economics 
Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation Management 
Rosenstraße 19 
10178 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: schade@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
Sabrina Boewe is a PhD candidate at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and a research associate 
for the research project “Innovation and coordination” funded by the Volkswagen Foundation 
which is a collaborative effort with Columbia University and the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin). Her major research areas are experimental economics, 
economic psychology and entrepreneurial decision making.  
Address: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
School of Business and Economics 
Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation Management 
Rosenstraße 19 
10178 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: boewe@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
Kai Krause is a former research associate of the Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and 
Innovation Management at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Today, he works as an independent 
consultant in Berlin, Germany. 
Address: 
Boxhagener Straße 54,  
10245 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: kai.oliver.krause@gmx.de  
 SiAg-Working Paper 4 (2009); HU Berlin 
SiAg-Working Paper 
SiAg Working Papers are published by the DFG research group “Structural Change in Agriculture”. 
The series comprises papers from research group members as well as from external authors with a 
focus on structural change in the agricultural sector. 
 
Editorial office 
 
Dr. Astrid Häger (Managing editor) 
e-mail: astrid.haeger@agrar.hu-berlin.de  
phone: +49-30-2093.6062 
Kerstin Oertel (Layout) 
e-mail: k.oertel@agrar.hu-berlin.de  
phone: +49-30-2093.6340 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Landwirtschaftlich-Gärtnerische Fakultät  
Department für Agrarökonomie 
FG Agrarpolitik 
Philippstr. 13, Haus 12A 
10099 Berlin (Germany 
 
 
SiAg-Working Paper Series 
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the DFG-Forschergruppe 986, please visit 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/browsing/series/index.php?l[5]=Einrichtungen&l[6]=Landwirtschaftlich-
G%C3%A4rtnerische+Fakult%C3%A4t&c[6][corp_id]=1002000&l[7]=SiAg+Working+Paper+-
&c[7][series_id]=28852&_=8b2769d5df1a50c259291ac307192f01. 
 
01 The disciplinary influence of physics, biology, and chemistry on economic modelling:  
Overview and implications for understanding agricultural change.  
Martin Petrick (February 2008) 
02 Holding On for Too Long? 
An Experimental Study on Inertia in Entrepreneurs’ and Non-Entrepreneurs’ Disinvestment Choices 
Serena Sandri, Christian Schade, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening (April 2009) 
03 The Role of Small Farms in Structural Change.  
Silke Hüttel and Anne Margarian (Juni 2009) 
04 Characterizing the female entrepreneur:  
Comparing behavior in a market entry experiment with other groups of individuals 
Christian Schade, Sabrina Boewe, and Kai Krause (April 2009) 
